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University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
ABSTRACT: Richard Langlois, Tony Yu & Paul Robertson have assembled a collection of previously 
published papers that move beyond textbook production theory. This essay discusses work by Frank 
Knight and Hendrik Houthakker not reproduced in LYR in relation to the capability theory of 
economic organization. Knight identified the problem of organization as the search for and the 
coordination of different dispersed capabilities. Houthakker helps us to see more clearly that the 
benefits of specialization are not brought at zero cost; whatever is the governance structure employed, 
there will inevitably be coordination costs due to differences in capabilities. 
 
1. Introduction1
Once upon a time, the firm was no enigma for economists. The firm coincided with a 
production function of the form Y = F(N, K), where Y represents output, and N and K the labor 
and the capital inputs. This function and the profit maximization objective constituted the 
whole of what an economist needed to know about the firm. Richard Langlois, Tony Yu & 
Paul Robertson have edited an impressive three–volume collection of previously published 
contributions by maverick scholars who question this conception of the firm. The collection 
(hereafter LYR) covers issues like bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, knowledge 
dispersion, opportunism, production coordination, shirking, technological and organizational 
coevolution, and the structure of production. It also gathers together a good deal of the 
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literature on organizations from the agency, Austrian, behavioralist, capability/competence, 
evolutionary, property rights, resource–based and transaction–cost perspectives. 
The breadth of LYR makes it a useful resource for anyone working in the general area 
of the economics of organization (a subset of which is the theory of the firm) and 
management theory. This is a fortiori so if one considers that the only ‘orthodoxy’ to which 
the collected articles are meant to provide an alternative ‘is the portrayal of the firm in the 
microeconomics textbook (whether it be freshman or postgraduate),’ according to the editors’ 
Introduction (Vol. I, p. xi). In other words, LYR collects a number of works that try to 
unpack—in different, but to a large extent complementary, ways—the familiar cost curves by 
exploring the nature of the firm from different angles. 
The purpose of this essay is not so much to challenge the alternative theories contained 
in LYR as to supplement them. But because LYR is a massive collection of articles that look 
at the firm through many different theoretical frameworks, the discussion will, of necessity, 
be selective. In many ways in fact, the present essay, like the contents of LYR, is part of a 
still-emerging research program concerning alternative theories whose boundaries must be 
considered sufficiently fluid to allow for analytical developments along any of several now-
predictable trajectories. This provisional situation leaves me free to discuss one particular 
theory within this emerging research program without paying too much attention to the other 
constituent theories. I therefore propose to concentrate on a theory that appears to be less-
known than the others and to which the editors have made a substantial contribution, namely, 
capability theory (this approach is the subject of LYR, Vol. II, Part I; see Nelson & Winter, 
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1982, ch. 5; Langlois, 1988; Langlois & Robertson, 1993; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997; and 
Yu, 2001).2
The collection under review omits two contributions that fall within its scope: the first 
chapter of Frank Knight’s The Economic Organization (1933b); and Hendrik Houthakker’s 
‘Economics and Biology: Specialization and Speciation’ (1956). Knight’s chapter outlines 
what later became the central tenet of capability theory, viz., that the primary purpose of 
economic organization is to search for and to coordinate dispersed and specific knowledge. 
Houthakker’s article, though not explicitly concerned with matters of economic organization, 
examines the two cost aspects of the coordination problem, viz., internal and external, that 
capability theory recognizes only obliquely. These ‘missing links’ do not weaken capability 
theory. As the discussion will make clear, quite the contrary is the case. 
 
2. Capability Theory 
We owe the birth of capability theory to G. B. Richardson, who had, in turn, been influenced 
by Edith Penrose (1959). Capabilities refer to that specific—i.e., not easily articulable or 
transferable—production knowledge that traditional production theory ignores.3 This aspect 
of production capabilities has nontrivial consequences: it means that notwithstanding the same 
technological structure of production—which can indeed be rendered in terms of a common 
production function—production overheads may in actual fact differ. Although ‘production 
                                                 
2 The capability approach is also known as the competence approach (see Heiner, 1983; Dosi & Marengo, 1994). 
The organizational capability approach is to be distinguished from the more recent capability approach proposed 
by Amartya Sen (e.g., 1994) and others in the field of economic development. 
3 Following Michael Polanyi (1958), subsequent literature has also referred to such knowledge as tacit 
knowledge. Polanyi’s oft-cited example of tacit knowledge refers to the inability of Hungarians to get a light-
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official of a nongovernmental organization recounted to me once how the apparently trivial operation of using a 
screwdriver turned out to be a major impasse when explaining how to install water heaters in a developing 
country. Not all knowledge can be represented by a set of blueprints. 
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functions presume a certain level of managerial and material technology,’ writes Richardson, 
the  
point is not that production is thus dependent on the state of the arts but that it 
has to be undertaken (as Mrs. Penrose has so very well explained) by 
organisations embodying specifically appropriate experience and skill. It is this 
circumstance that formal production theory tends to put out of focus, and 
justifiably, no doubt, given the character of the optimisation problem that it is 
designed to handle; nevertheless … we cannot hope to construct an adequate 
theory of industrial organisation and in particular to answer our question about 
the division of labour between firm and market, unless the elements of 
organisation, knowledge, experience and skills [i.e., capabilities] are brought 
back to the foreground of our vision. (Richardson, 1972, p. 888)  
 
To explain ‘the division of labour between firm and market,’ Richardson proposes a 
theory of economic organization founded on specialization and coordination. In general, says 
Richardson, a firm specializes in activities that draw on its pool of similar capabilities. As a 
result, it will also undertake activities that are similar. But this need not always be the case, 
especially in more complex organizations that deal with more sophisticated or multiple 
activities. In these other cases, the process of production will obviously regard the 
coordination of activities that are complementary but not necessarily similar. For instance, 
automobile production needs the coordination of activities having to do with (among other 
things) the production, handling, and assembly of metal, glass, electronics and engines. In 
cases such as these, coordination involves activities that are dissimilar and that need ‘to be 
matched, in level or specification’ (Richardson, 1972, p. 895), that is, coordination requires 
dissimilar capabilities. 
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This entails that even though some firms may share some capabilities of production 
they will not necessarily share coordinative capabilities for the production process. So, to 
continue with our example, today the production of electronics for cars shares capabilities 
with the production of electronics for laptop computers. We may as a result have a firm that 
produces electronics for both cars and laptops, because such production shares similar 
capabilities. But the coordination of the process of production of electronics for cars has little 
to do with the coordination of production of electronics for laptops: electronics for laptops 
need to be coordinated with the production of, e.g., monitors, printers and scanners. The 
coordination of different types of production processes can therefore define the boundary 
between firm and market (meaning other firms).4
Current capability theory has extended Richardson’s approach by blending 
considerations of production with those of exchange, i.e., capabilities with transactions. This 
blending, aimed at more sharply distinguishing the firm–market boundary, has taken place 
along two trajectories. The first of these trajectories (chronologically speaking) was originated 
by David Teece (1980, 1986, 1988). The second, which is actually a broadening of the first, is 
the work of Langlois and various coauthors (Langlois, 1988; Langlois & Robertson, 1993; 
Langlois & Foss, 1999). 
Teece blends Williamsonian transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979, 1984) 
with Richardsonian and Penrosean considerations. Williamson’s approach is founded on asset 
specificity, namely, on the assumption that some assets for production are not fungible but 
can only be used for a unique task (paradigmatically: an automobile die). When a transaction 
                                                 
4 This 1972 view of economic organization provides an answer to the complaint raised more than twenty five 
years later by Holmström & Roberts (1998, p. 90) that information and knowledge ‘have long been understood to 
be different from goods and assets commonly traded in markets. In light of this, it is surprising that the leading 
economic theories of firm boundaries have paid almost no attention to the role of organizational knowledge.’ In a 
footnote attached to this complaint, Holmström & Roberts note that ‘researchers outside economic theory have 
made much of the role of knowledge’ (emphasis added). 
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is specific in Williamson’s sense, it may threaten a contractual relationship, because it may 
subject the owners of the specific assets to rent-seeking behavior by the other transactional 
parties. In different terms, some contractual parties may behave opportunistically in the 
presence of asset specificity. Standard market contracts cannot govern opportunism and, as a 
result, efficiency requires vertical integration. This approach hence replaces the familiar 
marginal production cost calculation with a marginal cost calculation of devising, executing 
and supervising transaction completion. In doing so, it holds technology constant. 
The primary merit of Teece’s work is to have emphasized that technology should not 
be held constant for the determination of the firm–market boundary. More precisely, Teece 
focuses on (i) the nature of innovation and (ii) the institutional environment within which 
innovation occurs. The more radical the innovation, the more difficult it is for the market 
spontaneously to coordinate the complementary (but not necessarily similar) capabilities that 
are innate to it (and vice versa). A radical innovation, in short, is generally more likely to be 
subject to internalization and to have an impact on firm boundaries. Furthermore, Teece 
emphasizes, innovation does not take place in an institutional vacuum. The weaker the ability 
of an institutional environment to guarantee returns to an innovation, the higher the 
probability that such innovation will be a cause of vertical integration. An entrepreneur-
innovator will alter the boundaries of the firm through vertical integration when the 
institutional setting does not guarantee the appropriation of rents from the innovation (i.e., 
when others can free ride on the benefits of the innovation). 
The second capability trajectory is more eclectic than the first. It explicitly 
endogenizes Austrian, Marshallian, Schumpeterian and transaction cost considerations. But it 
places more emphasis on the cognitive nature of both capabilities and transactions. It is 
grounded in a useful biological metaphor (see especially Langlois, 1995). 
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We live in uncertain environments. Uncertainty derives in good measure from the 
limited cognition (dispersed and specific capabilities) of different economic actors. 
Consequently, knowledge differences lead to division of labor and to specialization 
throughout the economy. A firm is that entrepreneurial organ that utilizes such division of 
labor and specialization to achieve some more or less well-defined ends. As such, it is akin to 
a biological organism that, in order to survive, must respond to different external stimuli in an 
appropriate fashion. Thus, a healthy firm—one that is able to create and recreate its own 
opportunity set (Penrose, 1959, pp. 31–33)—will eventually evolve (or, if you prefer, will 
specialize) to the point where it possesses some ‘department’ that has the specific role of 
dealing with this important survival function. For all practical purposes we may consider this 
department to be the mind of the firm. In time, the stable environment provided by a firm 
allows for the learning processes crucial for long-term planning, i.e., for those survival 
strategies necessary to deal with change. Knight’s work is a useful point of reference: when 
‘uncertainty is present and the task of deciding what to do and how to do it takes the 
ascendancy over that of execution,’ he writes in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1933a, pp. 268–
269), ‘the internal organization of the productive groups is no longer a matter of indifference 
or a mechanical detail. … Centralization of this deciding and controlling function is 
imperative, a process of “cephalization”, such as has taken place in the evolution of organic 
life, is inevitable, and for the same reasons as in the case of biological evolution.’5 A good 
proxy for this type of organization with functional specialization would be the corporate 
multidivisional form in which strategic decision-making is separate from routine operations. 
                                                 
5 This does not mean that a healthy firm will always plan according to explicit rational criteria, such as 
maximization of expected profit. Rather, it implies that a firm will tend to adapt to changing circumstances: 
versatility is what matters (Langlois, 1995). 
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This biological digression suggests that this second capability trajectory foremost rests 
on a Smithian specialization argument. It therefore more explicitly returns to a Richardsonian 
observation: markets tend to specialize in the coordination of knowledge that is intelligible to 
all (data about prices and quantities), while firms tend to specialize in the coordination of 
knowledge that is instead specific (capabilities of production) in order to achieve some ends. 
Moreover, similarly to Teece, innovation too is important to identify the boundaries of 
the firm. But, unlike Teece, who, as we saw, suggests that given a weak institutional 
environment vertical integration is necessary for the entrepreneur–innovator to appropriate 
rents that otherwise would be captured by others, here technological innovation changes the 
boundaries of the firm primarily for another reason. Vertical integration can also occur 
because not all downstream producers have the capability to understand the messages of the 
entrepreneur–innovator. Vertical integration can therefore solve communication failures that 
arise in organizational environments that are subject to change (see Silver, 1984). 
One substantive implication of this is that transaction costs should be seen in less 
static terms, that is, as costs that arise primarily from imperfections in knowledge à la 
Dahlman (e.g., 1980, pp. 79–86). We may think of these dynamic transaction costs as the 
costs of bargaining with, coordinating with, informing, learning from, organizing, teaching, 
and persuading others: they are costs incurred for the search, organization and employment of 
the required capabilities when these are lacking (Langlois & Robertson, 1993). In light of this, 
it is not possible to separate capabilities from transactions. But because of their differing 
natures, the two basic functions of economic organization, namely, production and exchange, 
have traditionally not been treated as tightly interconnected processes. The more eclectic 
capability trajectory is, however, able to render them indissoluble by placing uncertainty at 
center stage. 
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Does this cognitive organizational vision run counter to Coase’s original contractual 
message whereby the distinguishing mark of the firm is ‘the supersession of the price 
mechanism’ (Coase, 1937, p. 389)? Langlois & Foss (1999, p. 204) believe (correctly in my 
view) that the answer is no. Long-term incomplete contracts, they argue, enable firms to 
operate with much greater ‘flexibility because they eliminate haggling and communication 
costs and allow those who possess superior knowledge to direct less-informed others. And 
when “the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the 
buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a ‘firm’ may be obtained” (Coase, 1937, pp. 
391–392). Thus … Coase’s explanation for the emergence of the firm is ultimately a 
coordination one: the firm is an institution that lowers the costs of qualitative coordination….’  
 
3. Missing Links 
The main message of capability theory is that there is often more to the conscious 
organization of inputs than the quantities in which the inputs are combined.6 In fact, as 
Radner (1992) has noted, economic organization is largely (if not primarily) about the 
combinatorics of heterogeneous productive knowledge. This message runs counter to what is 
often implicitly assumed in microeconomics textbooks, where the process of production and 
the outcome of production coincide. The more complex purpose of economic organization 
may be concisely restated following an early (textbook!) definition offered by Knight. 
Economic organization particularly matters ‘when different things are being done, in the 
furtherance of a common end, and in definite relations to each other, i.e., in coordination.’ 
Because there exist ‘some innate individual differences in human capacities and aptitudes’—
                                                 
6 A similar point was made by the behavioralists (e.g., Leibenstein, 1966), who were an important reference 
point for capability theory (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
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i.e., differences in capabilities—‘the first in the list of gains from organization results from 
taking advantage of [these differences]. One … problem is to discover such differences and 
utilize them as far as possible’ (Knight, 1933b, pp. 6, 17). 
This broader restatement of the purpose of economic organization points to two 
problems. Let us call the first the coordination cost problem, and the second the search cost 
problem. As we will see, both problems are essentially capability ones, particularly in line 
with those investigated by the second trajectory. Consider them in reverse order. 
The search problem refers to the discovery of different capabilities so as to organize 
them in a productive fashion. The discovery of different capabilities in order to employ them 
in pursuit of one’s objectives is not costless however. Capability search is expensive: there are 
significant (dynamic) transaction costs involved. Given capability dispersion, the problem of 
organizational setup does not usually have a cheap and easy solution. 
But the search problem is not exhausted once a firm is set up. The search for the 
capabilities needed to achieve organizational objectives is incessant. Richardson’s matching 
‘in level or specification’ continues throughout the lifecycle of a healthy firm, which 
constantly strives to place capability and rights to act on that capability in the same hands—a 
co-location problem. 
Jensen & Meckling (1992) specify that there are generally two ways we might solve 
this problem of co-location.7 We could let knowledge move to those who have the rights to 
act; or we could let the rights to act move to those with knowledge. The co-location of 
decision rights to (nonspecific) knowledge is possible only in markets. In a market I have the 
right to shop for the brand of tuna that I like, even though I may not know the grocery store 
that sells my favorite brand until I do some searching. More generally, in a market I can 
                                                 
7 The discussion that follows draws on Garzarelli (2006). 
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voluntarily exchange or sell the decision rights that accompany my knowledge. This is not 
possible in internal organization. For example, an employee, bureaucrat or politician cannot 
(legally) sell (or exchange) his or her job (the bundle of employment rights, which includes 
decision rights over assigned tasks) to someone else and capture proceeds from such 
alienation. 
In internal organization individuals are traditionally directed to a task on the basis of 
their implied capabilities, that is, the co-location proceeds in the opposite direction of 
markets—from (specific) knowledge to decision rights. Now, there are infinite ways to co-
locate capabilities to decision rights. For instance, in fordist production (a rigid vertical 
organization of the division of labor) we have limited decision-right autonomy. Ultimate 
decision rights remain at the top of the hierarchy, notwithstanding the fact that a few basic 
rights are distributed along the way. In a strategic network alliance the decision rights are 
present both across and within the allied firms. To take one example, allied automobile firms 
may for a period of time share the ultimate decision rights about which common chassis 
design to adopt for a line of their automobile models. Simultaneously, however, the 
manufactures have the ultimate decision rights over whether to pursue different individual 
strategic plans. 
This suggests that the difference among different organizational forms resides in the 
degree of decision-right autonomy.8 Hence, one ‘efficiency’ criterion to evaluate different 
organizational forms on a comparative basis may reside in their relative ability to facilitate the 
                                                 
8 Indirectly, this also means that the dichotomy between firm and market is off the mark. Again, this is so 
because the market is about the co-location of decision rights to nonspecific knowledge (prices and quantities), 
while the firm, and internal organization more generally, is about a variety of co-locations of specific knowledge 
(capabilities) to decision rights. The spectrum is not one involving market versus firm but is comprised of trade-
offs among a variety of internal organizations, which include the firm (Garzarelli, 2006). The literature has 
alluded to this, though from a variety of angles that are different from the one adopted here; see, for example, 
Fourie (1989), Dietrich (1991) and Phelan & Lewin (2000). 
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co-location of capabilities and decision-making. This is a criterion that is seldom considered 
in the literature, but that, given its dynamic nature, is in line with capability theory. 
Note that the co-location process is not limited to organizational boundaries: the 
attempt by healthy firms to provide a perfect mapping between capability and rights to act on 
that capability through time may require that appropriate capabilities be sought outside 
organizational boundaries. As we have noted, the creation of value is not a static problem. 
Accordingly, in any point in time the scope of a firm and its internal organization may also be 
a function of co-location. This does not concurrently mean that firms do not incur costs of co-
location over time. Dynamic transaction costs are incurred in the attempt to co-locate 
capabilities of production at efficient cost. In fact, these costs from co-location are (one type 
of) coordination cost that the capability approach considers crucial. 
We may think of the coordination problem as referring to two types of cost: internal 
and external (Houthakker, 1956). In traditional craft production, a sequential production 
process is entirely undertaken as well as coordinated by a single artisan. In the souk of Tunis, 
for example, we find shoemakers who perform every production task—cutting the hide, 
stitching the sole, dying the leather black or brown and so on right down to haggling with 
customers. In cases such as this the artisan does not need to coordinate any of his production 
tasks with any other artisan. Whether the artisan’s capabilities are fully matched to the 
requirements of each stage of production is factually irrelevant, for both absolute and 
comparative advantages dominate the entire production sequence (limiting the extent of the 
market). 
Thus, in craft production co-location costs are negligible. In practice, the artisan is not 
performing a co-location of capability and rights beyond himself: the capability and rights 
match not necessarily because of specialization but rather because the same individual is 
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working on all stages of production irrespective of specialization. There is co-location by 
natural composition. As a result, what the artisan experiences are only internal coordination 
costs: he internally coordinates a production process—his own—that exhibits low division of 
labor. In essence, internal coordination costs emerge when an individual needs to coordinate 
single-handedly not only his own capabilities but also his production sequence. 
As individuals specialize, more attention must be directed to co-location, and 
comparative advantage is not a matter of indifference. Indeed, to benefit from economies of 
specialization, the organization needs to match capabilities to stages of production as fully as 
possible. And, as we have seen, this means trying to co-locate capability and rights to act on 
that capability. As an individual specializes in the performance of one task, the need for that 
individual to coordinate that task to the rest of the production sequence becomes negligible; 
that is, internal coordination costs approach zero, ceteris paribus. This is so because at least 
one production task has become a trade of its own. 
At the same time it becomes necessary for someone (or something) else to specialize 
in the coordination of production, which includes the ability to co-locate capabilities with 
rights to act on those capabilities. When production becomes separated from coordination, 
external coordination costs manifest themselves. External coordination costs are external in 
the sense of lying outside the responsibility of production of the individual (who is now a 
specialist rather than a generalist), but they are not necessarily outside the process of 
production. They refer to the coordination of different outputs from different specialized 
individuals by another individual (or another firm or machine) specialized in coordination. 
This is an instance of Smithian division of labor which Houthakker calls speciation, namely, a 
process whereby specialization assumes specific and independent forms of its own (see also 
Young, 1928). We thus see the emergence of entrepreneurship, management, system 
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integrators and the like that coordinate production.9 Note that external coordination can refer 
to processes within as well as across organizational boundaries. System integrators, for 
example, are firms that are specialized in interfirm coordination; while a manager may only 
have the task of coordinating a single department of his firm. 
Houthakker’s framework enables us to bring into sharper focus an important point that 
is only implicit in capability theory: it introduces the extent of the market in conjunction with 
coordination costs. In internally coordinated craft production the extent of the market is 
limited by lack of specialization. But specialization bears the overhead costs of external 
coordination: here the extent of the market is limited by the amount of specialization that 
needs to be (externally) coordinated. More generally, the extent of the market depends on the 
relation ‘between … external and … internal coordination costs’ (Houthakker, 1956, p. 185). 
Much like the origin of dynamic transaction costs, the trade-off between internal and external 
coordination costs—between individual coordination costs and coordination costs among 
individuals (or various organizational forms)—has cognitive roots. Houthakker explains: 
It is … from indivisibilities that the division of labor takes its start, and the 
basic indivisibility is that of the individual … .  For our purpose we may regard 
an individual as a coordinated complex of activities. The indivisibility of the 
individual consists in the fact that, although it may be capable of a great many 
different activities, it can perform only few activities simultaneously because 
most activities utilize the same resources and more particularly that 
coordinating resource which is known as the brain. The larger the number of 
simultaneous activities, the greater the difficulty of coordinating them and of 
carrying out each one properly, and the smaller therefore the output from each 
activity. This applies not only to simultaneous activities, but also to activities 
                                                 
9 See Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt (2001) on system integrators and compare for example Knight (1933a) on the 
entrepreneurial function, uncertainty and specialization. 
 14
that are spread out over time. In the first place some shorter or longer interval 
is usually needed to switch from one activity to another; in the second place it 
is usually easier to perform activities that are known from previous experience 
than to perform them for the first time. 
 All this, the economist will note at once, can be put in terms of 
increasing returns. We have increasing returns to the extent that, if several 
activities are replaced by a single one, there is less need for [internal] 
coordination and switching time and more scope for acquiring experience. The 
output of the single activity may thus be raised above the combined outputs of 
the several activities. (Houthakker, 1956, pp. 182–183) 
 
But raising output to benefit from increasing returns has external coordination costs, which, 
being limited by our limited cognition like internal coordination costs, limit the extent of the 
market as well. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have surveyed a set of theoretical frameworks that attempt to go beyond the production 
function approach that dominates textbook discussions of economic organization. Our focus 
has been on the capability approach, which we have sought to reinforce by drawing on work 
by Frank Knight and Hendrik Houthakker not reproduced in the collection under review. 
Knight identified the fundamental problem of economic organization as the search for and 
coordination of different capabilities that are dispersed throughout the larger social and 
economic system. Houthakker helps us to see more clearly that the benefits of specialization 
are not obtained at zero cost; whatever is the governance structure employed, there will 
inevitably be coordination costs due to differences in capabilities. 
 
 15
References 
An asterisk indicates that the work is reproduced in full or in part in LYR. 
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A. & Pavitt, K. (2001) Knowledge specialization, organisational 
coupling, and the boundaries of the firm: why do firms know more than they make?, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 46, pp. 597–621. 
*Coase, R. H. (1937) The Nature of the Firm, Economica, N.S., 4, pp. 386–405. 
Dahlman, C. J. (1980) The Open Field System and Beyond. A Property Rights Analysis of an 
Economic Institution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Dietrich, M. (1991) Firms, markets and transaction cost economics, Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 38, pp. 41–57. 
*Dosi, G. & Marengo, L. (1994) Some elements of an evolutionary theory of organizational 
competences, in: R. W. England (Ed.), Evolutionary Concepts in Contemporary 
Economics 9Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Fourie, F. C. v. N. (1989) The nature of firms and markets: do transaction approaches help? 
South African Journal of Economics, 57, pp. 142–160. 
Garzarelli, G. (2006) Cognition, incentives and public governance: laboratory federalism from 
the organizational viewpoint, Public Finance Review, 34, pp. 235–257. 
Heiner, R. A. (1983) The origin of predictable behavior, American Economic Review, 73, pp. 
560–595. 
Holmström, B. & Roberts, R. (1998) The boundaries of the firm revisited, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 12, pp. 73–94. 
Houthakker, H. S. (1956) Economics and biology: specialization and speciation, Kyklos, 9, 
pp. 181–189. 
 16
*Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1992) Specific and general knowledge, and 
organizational structure, in: L. Werin & H. Wijkander (Eds) Contract Economics 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
*Knight, F. H. (1933a) Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (with an additional introductory essay 
hitherto unpublished). London: London School of Economics and Political Science 
(Re–issue No. 16 in a Series of Reprints of Scarce Tracts in Economics and Political 
Science). First published 1921. 
Knight, F. H. (1933b) The Economic Organization (New York: A. M. Kelley, 1951). 
*Langlois, R. N. (1988) Economic change and the boundaries of the firm, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 144, pp. 635–657. 
Langlois, R. N. (1995) Do firms plan?, Constitutional Political Economy 6, pp. 247–261. 
*Langlois, R. N. & Foss, N. J. (1999) Capabilities and governance: the rebirth of production 
in the theory of economic organization, Kyklos 52, pp. 201–218. 
*Langlois, R. N. & Robertson, P. L.  (1993) Business organization as a coordination problem: 
towards a dynamic theory of the boundaries of the firm, Business and Economic History 
22, pp. 31–41. 
*Leibenstein, H. (1966) Allocative Efficiency vs. ‘X–efficiency’, American Economic Review 
57, pp. 1–33. 
*Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G.  (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Pres of Harvard University Press). 
*Penrose, E. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995).  
Phelan, S. E. & Lewin, P. (2000) Arriving at a strategic theory of the firm, International 
Journal of Management Reviews 2, pp. 305–323. 
 17
Polanyi, M. (1958) Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post–critical Philosophy (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
*Radner, R. (1992) Hierarchy: The economics of managing, Journal of Economic Literature 
30, pp. 1382–1415. 
*Richardson, G. B. (1972) The organization of industry, Economic Journal, 82, pp. 883–896. 
Sen, A. K. (1994) Well–being, capability and public policy, Giornale degli Economisti e 
Annali di Economia, N.S., 53, pp. 333–347. 
*Silver, M. (1984) Enterprise and the Scope of the Firm (Oxford: Martin Robertson). 
*Teece, D. J. (1980) Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise, Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 1, pp. 223–247.  
*Teece, D. J. (1986) Profiting from technological innovation: implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy, Research Policy, 15, pp. 285–305. 
*Teece, D. J. (1988) Technological change and the nature of the firm, in: G. Dosi, C. 
Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg & L. Soete (Eds) Technical Change and Economic 
Theory (London: Pinter). 
*Teece, D. J., Pisano, G. & Shuen, A. (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management, 
Strategic Management Journal, 18, pp. 509–533. 
*Williamson, O. E. (1979) Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, pp. 233–261. 
*Williamson, O. E. (1984) The economics of governance: framework and implications, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 140, pp. 691–719. 
*Young, A. A. (1928) Increasing returns and the economic progress, Economic Journal, 38, 
pp.  527–542. 
 18
Yu, T. F. L. (2001) Firms, Governments and Economic Change: An Entrepreneurial 
Perspective (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
 19
